What would a Kamala Harris Middle East Policy look like?

Taylor Luck

 

"Do you think she can win?" And "What are her positions?"

These are the questions that are swirling in Arab capitals and Tel Aviv in the wake of President Biden's shock decision to end his re-election bid and Kamala Harris' surprise emergence as the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee last week.

As I reported last Wednesday, governments, groups and non-state actors across the Middle East are racing to recalibrate and prepare for a potential Harris Administration now that a second Trump presidency, and his transactionalism many are comfortable with, is no longer a fait accompli.

Despite the Vice President's presence on the world stage and in international forums the past four years—particularly on Ukraine—governments and groups here are discovering that her track-record on the Middle East is thin.

Although all expect her to be a reliable multilateralist, few believe she will represent a full continuation of Biden's post-World War II pragmatic internationalism.

Even under Biden, officials here say his Administration’s Middle East policy has been muddled at best and non-existent at worse.

“Biden’s Middle East policy changes depending on which advisor you speak to,” multiple Arab officials have told me over the past year.

So what would a Harris Administration’s Middle East policy look like?

One can only look to Harris' statements so far.

Harris’ Rhetorical Dance on Gaza

While insisting her “ironclad” support for Israel’s security, Harris has been distancing herself from President Biden on Gaza, using high-profile speeches over the past several months to denounce the high Palestinian civilian casualties and urge Israel to ease the humanitarian suffering in the Strip.

Speaking at COP28 in Dubai last December, Vice President Harris urged Israel to comply with international humanitarian law, stating “too many innocent Palestinians have been killed,” and describing the images from Gaza as “devastating.”

In February, Harris became the first Administration official to openly call for a ceasefire. She was the first in the White House to publicly recognize that Gaza was in the grips of famine-like conditions in March, calling the situation “inhumane,” saying Israel “must do more to significantly increase the flow of aid—no excuses.”

Since she became the presumptive Democratic nominee last week, the contrasts between the Vice President and her boss on Gaza have become starker.

Choosing to attend a campaign event rather than preside over Netanyahu’s speech to Congress for last Wednesday was a clear message that Harris was distancing herself from President Biden’s bear-hugs for Bibi.

Using her meeting with Netanyahu to urge Israel reach a ceasefire deal and end what Israeli military officials admit is an unwinnable war was another.

“We cannot look away in the face of these tragedies [in Gaza]. We cannot allow ourselves to become numb to the suffering and I will not be silent,” Harris said in statements after meeting with Netanyahu.

Some pundits have praised Harris’s careful rhetoric, hyping her statements as a needle-threading path to winning over anti-Gaza war and primary “undecided” voters to victory.

Don’t believe the hype. A few harsh words do not a policy make.

Throughout the Gaza war, the Vice President has expressed more empathy and concern for Palestinian civilians than President Biden—but that is a low bar to clear.

And empathy alone cannot end wars or stop famine.

Don’t believe the hype. A few harsh words do not a policy make.

Some officials here believe a Harris Administration would resemble the Obama Administration: skeptical of US involvement in the Middle East and representing a shift in rhetoric towards Israel and the Palestinians, but not a shift in policy.

President Obama’s icy relationship with Netanyahu and denouncing of settlement expansions are described by some Israeli officials as a “low-point” in modern US-Israel relations. Some fear Harris’s tough statements signal a repeat.

Yet this low-point did not see steps towards Palestinian statehood or lessen American vetoes in the UN Security Council.

The challenges and dilemmas that would face a President Harris are much steeper.

As commander in chief, how would she improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza if Hamas retains some control over the Strip, parts of the enclave slip into anarchy and no Arab or international partner is willing to step into an insurgency?

Vice President Harris stressed last week that “Israel has the right to defend itself. But how it does so matters.”

But would a President Harris allow Palestinians and their allies in Europe and Africa to push for justice and accountability for Israel’s violations of international humanitarian law?

Would a President Harris stand down in the face of International Criminal Court warrants for Netanyahu and defence minister Yoav Gallant?

Foreign Policy Advisors

If the Vice President’s track-record offers little clues, one can take a closer look to that of her national security advisor Phillip Gordon. A veteran diplomat and former White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf, under the Obama Administration, Gordon is well-respected across the region. Current and former officials from Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Europe sang his praises to me over the past week.

It is widely believed that Gordon and his team stand for responsible American internationalism with scepticism of over-extending, over-investing and state-building.

Despite his decades-long track record as a policymaker, diplomat, and fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, Gordon’s published works do not betray what kind of Mideast policy he would urge a Harris Administration to pursue.

The most illustrative look is Gordon’s 2020 book Losing The Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East.

In it, Gordon dissects seven decades of diplomatic folly from the 1953 CIA-backed coup of Iranian nationalist prime minister Mohammad Mosadegh to the 2003 Iraq War and the early 2010s, outlining how Washington undermined, overthrew and installed regimes to further its interests to mixed to disastrous results.

In warning against the costly “temptation” of regime change, he details all the fatal flaws and hubris of decisionmakers who ignored dissenting voices or blindly pursued idealism, with a policy-wonk’s eye for detail. He goes on to admit the “wishful thinking” of the Obama Administration’s backing of opposition and rebel forces during the Arab Spring in Libya, Egypt, and Syria, which, like Afghanistan and Iraq, he says ended in “disastrous results.”

As in his 2015 Politico article The Middle East is Falling Apart, Gordon argues that the US cannot “fix” the Middle East’s problems, let alone “remake” it.  

The book—an excellent read—offers no clear policy alternative. But there is a consistent through-line, which Gordon states explicitly: “Americans Don’t Know Enough About the Middle East.”

Two decades on from 9/11 and two disastrous wars, we are past the point of needing basic knowledge. America needs to do more than be cautious and avoid doing “stupid s***” in the Middle East, as one recent President put it.

The “no stupid s****” overcorrection of the Bush years saw America shy away from some of the toughest Middle East crises in the 2010s, leaving many to fester and erupt into today’s wars, such as Sudan, Israel-Palestine and Gaza.

US Middle East policy for 2024

As Harris slowly moves from rhetoric to articulating policy, the type of American foreign policy needed for the Middle East in 2024 is clear.

America needs a Middle East policy built on realistic national interests, that upholds regional stability and pursues partnerships to tackle shared global challenges such as climate change, AI and food security. It pains me that this has to be written yet again, but Washington should avoid aiding, abetting or causing mass bloodshed.

And, where and when possible, decision-makers should ensure our policies and billions in tax-payer-funded financial and military aid are aligned with our nation’s values. A more socially-conscious generation of Millennial and Gen Z voters will hold them to it.

Some voters may flock to President Trump’s “America First” isolationist deal-making as a viable alternative. But in four years, the personality-led transactionalism failed to coalesce into policy, had no policy goals, and led to Middle Power competition that helped sow the seeds of today’s violence. 

The historic opportunity for a shift in US foreign policy is clear.

This year marks the first presidential election in the 21st Century in which neither candidate voted for or was involved in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Although the ghosts of America’s forever wars will continue to haunt the communities they ravaged and the veterans who served, now is a chance to exorcise them from Washington.

The historic opportunity for a shift in US foreign policy is clear.

Now is a time for the US to chart a new, sensible path on the Middle East guided by future goals, not by past mistakes. And there might not be much time.

Fresh crises are set to push the Middle East at the top of Harris’ agenda even before November’s election—a war between Israel and Hezbollah looms, Iran’s nuclear weapons threshold is weeks away, a genocide and famine is unfolding in Sudan, Gaza is descending into collapse and chaos.

These crises are colliding at a time we have no clear, coherent policy stating what the US is doing in the region militarily, politically and economically and why.

As she articulates her vision for America, now is the chance for Kamala Harris to answer that question.

 

The views expressed in this article are solely those of Taylor Luck and do not represent the views of his employers, partners or affiliations.

Next
Next

Talk- Rebuilding Trust